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Organicism
Organicism has generally meant different things to different individuals, and the term is often
used wi thout clarity. The problem is that, though there is a core conception to organicism that
most share, other, sometimes loosely related, ideas are often associated with this core conception
or thought to be implied by it. The shared core conception involves an ontological thesis
concerning internal relations between things. Two things are internally related if their natures
and/or activities depend fundamentally upon their relation to one another. Internal relations are
contrasted with external relations between things where the natures and/or activities of things
related to one another are relatively independent of the relations between them. Thus organicism
is first and foremost a view about the essential connectedness of things in reality.
Some philosophers have gone on from this characterization of kinds of relations to make further
claims about what basic entities populate the world. On an external relations view, the world
is made up of self-contained things or atoms, the relations between which are explainable in
terms of what we understand about the atoms (for example, Wittgenstein, 1922). On an
internal relations view, the world is rather made up of relations, such that the things they relate,
or their relata, are explainable in terms of what we understand about relations (for example,
Bradley, 1930). From this perspective, organicism is to be contrasted with atomism. Note,
however, that casting organicism and atomism in terms of competing views of the whole of
reality takes us beyond our focus on the core conception of organicism as a form of relation
between things, since there is nothing in the idea of how two things are related that necessarily
refers us to the nature of reality as a whole. Indeed, one could believe that reality as a whole
included internally and externally related things, and consequently it would be careless to suppose
that making a case for one sort of relation in one context implies that that sort of relation must
apply universally. The tendency to make claims about the nature of the whole of reality is
nonetheless often associated with organicist views, perhaps because seeing the world as a
collection of things does not as naturally suggest the idea of a totality as does seeing the world
as relation. A view related to organicism in the narrow sense which adds further claims about
the whole of reality is holism.
Holism may be framed in terms of principles that apply specifically to the whole of some
set of things or activities, or are emergent at the level of the whole (Jackson and Pettit, 1992),
but it is perhaps more commonly framed in terms of whole-part relationships. Holist whole-part
analysis is a species of organicism when the relationship between the two determines the nature
and/or activities of each, or when whole and parts are said to be internally related. For example,
interactionist accounts of the way social structure and actor agents transform and recreate one
another can be whole-part organicist views (Giddens, 1984; Bhaskar, 1979). But not infrequently,
holist whole-part arguments tend to make parts depend only upon wholes, and not the reverse.
An example is the Post Keynesian inversion of the neoclassical reductionist project of
developing individualist rnicrofoundations for macroeconomics, namely the alternative project
of developing holist macrofoundations for microeconomics. Holism in this instance is not
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organicism, since the form of the relation between whole and part is not at issue, but rather
whether whole or part has conceptual priority. Holism in this context is consequently better
contrasted with reductionism. The related prescriptivist methodologies, methodological holism
(sometimes collectivism) and methodological individualism, also counterpose holism and
reductionism. Strictly speaking, these are not about organicism and atomism either, though
confusion sometimes arises when methodological individualism is labelled 'atomistic
individualism ' .
Holist arguments, then, need to employ an internal relations analysis to be organicist. But
holism may also be thought organicist when the whole is modelled on the idea of a living
organism. In this instance, not only are the parts of an organism typically thought jointly
instrumental to the life of the whole, thus suggesting the idea of their being organically
connected, but the connotation possessed by the term 'organism' is sometimes conflated with
the ontological internal relations idea. Living organisms and societies, of course, are complex
entities, and metaphorical transfer of the idea of an organism to societies and economies must
necessarily elide important differences between them. Nonetheless, some writers, such as
Menger (1985), Veblen (1899b), Hobson (1914) and Hayek (1973), have favoured organic
analogies as an alternative to reliance upon mechanical ones in social science. Organicism in
this instance contrasts with mechanism, the view that organisms are no more than complex
mechanisms and that the laws of matter and motion govern the phenomena of life.
Organicism in this tradition additionally emphasizes the idea that socioeconomic systems
are evolutionary in nature. Menger argued that society could be regarded as an organism in the
sense that its institutions evolved spontaneously as the unintended result of individual human
actions. Society exhibits an organic unity in that its institutions relate to society as organs relate
to organism. Veblen believed that economic interest guided a cumulative growth in society' s
conventions and methods of life, which he took to be the basis of its institutions. Evolutionary
economics was 'a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated in terms of
the process itself (Veblen, 1899b: 77). Hobson , influenced by Veblen, took the evolution of
human wants and needs to be part of a wider process of organic development of society that
was guided by a coordinating reason. This organic purpose or directive power expressed 'a
collective consciousness and will ... capable of realising a collective vital end' (Hobson ,
1914: 15). Hayek, in contrast, denied that social order implies conscious planning or deliberate
design . Like Menger, Hayek held that the economy may be likened to an organism that
evolves, but added that cultural evolution operates through change in rules of conduct that evolve
when the groups who practise them are successful and displace those with other rules (Hayek,
1973: 18).
Putting aside holism, an altogether different phenomenon sometimes mistakenly taken to
involve organic connection is interdependence. Individuals, for example, may be interdependent
in the sense that one individual's activities are seen to elicit responses from other individual s
that then alter the first individual's activities. This suggests a relatedness which appears to
undermine the independence of the individuals so related, and which accordingly may be thought
to imply organic connection between individuals. However, evidence of feedback mechanisms
is compatible with the existence of external relations between interdependent things, as in
Walrasian systems of interdependent agents. Individuals are unchanged in their essential
nature as maximizing agents when prices, incomes and goods availability change, though such
changes affect how individuals maximize. In effect, economic agents are defined prior to accounts
of their interaction with one another. Interdependence would only imply organic connection
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if indi viduals' interaction transformed their behaviours. Some forms of game theory appear to
verge on this stronger conclusion, as for example in Sugden's (1986) arguments that conventions
emerge as evolutionarily behavioural stable strategies, though such a conclusion is controversial.
FinalIy, brief mention should be made of hysteresis and path-dependency analysis, historicism
and process views. Hysteresis denotes the persistent influence of past events on the present,
and pathdependent systems are ones which display a determinate, connected sequence of
events. But, necessarily, both notions only emphasize the transformative effects the past has
on the present, and clearly this unidirectional influence falIs short of the two-directional
internal relations idea of organic connection. Historicism is the idea that historical events are
ultimately governed by general laws of history. Organicist thinking has been linked to such views,
as in Hegel's (1930) notion that history is the progressive realization of Geist and in some versions
of the inevitability of communism in Marxism, but in most cases historical events are
expressions of historical laws which remain unconditioned themselves. Process views, which
emphasize the category of becoming, have had a number of representatives in the history of
philosophy, including Bergson and Whitehead. The idea of becoming as a unity of what is and
is not 10gicalIy depends upon the internal relations conception, but the idea's meaning as corningto-be and passing-away also distinguishes it from the internal relations conception much as
hysteresis/path-dependence and historicism are distinguished.
Organicism, then, is often difficult to identify, because many related but different views are
said to be organicist. Accordingly, grand claims seem best avoided when using the concept,
and attention seems better focused on more narrow tasks of characterizing specific examples
of relations. This may be difficult to accomplish in evolutionary contexts where authors are
committed to saying wholes may be likened to organisms, given their tendency sometimes to
substitute the term 'organicist' for the term 'organic'. Nonetheless, it seems important that such
a distinction be maintained, both to segregate the core internal relations conception and to alI ow
more clear development of the notion that wholes may be understood as organisms. The
former conception might thus be termed organicism and the latter termed the organic view.
JOHN

B. DAVIS

References
Bhaskar, R. (1979), The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophic Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences,
Brighton: Harvester.
Bradley, F.H . (1930), Appearance and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Giddens, A. (1984), The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambridge: Polity.
Hayek, F. (1973), Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 1: Rules and Order, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hegel, G. ( 1930), Philosophy of History, reprinted, New York: Dover, 1956.
Hobson, J. (1914), Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation, New York: Macmillan.
Menger, C. (1985), Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Economics, New
York: New York University Press.
Jackson , Frank and Philip Pettit (1992), ' In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism', Economics and Philosophy, 8, 11-21 .
Sugden, R. (1986), The Economics of Rights. Co·operation and Welfare, Oxford: Basil Blackwell .
Veblen, T. (I 899a), The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, New York: Macmillan.
Veblen, T. (I 899b), 'Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 12, (3), 373-97.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922), Tractatus Logico·Philosophicus, London: Kegan Paul.

